🚨 Sui's recent innovation is a Paradigm Shift in post-quantum migration, and it’s NOT JUST about blockchains. The new EdDSA-PQR protocol introduces a way to prove post-quantum ownership of a key without changing the address or rotating the private key. Why does this matter far beyond crypto? 🧵👇 1/ In blockchains, changing addresses or rotating keys breaks asset access, and is impossible for dormant users in @SuiNetwork, @solana, @NEARProtocol, @cosmos, @Cardano and co. EdDSA-PQR solves that with ZK proofs of ownership based on seed-derived keys, enabling a forkless, migration-ready path. 2/ But here's the real kicker: This method can help any system where root keys are burned-in or hard to rotate: – TLS root certs on embedded devices – VPN clients with fixed certificates – IoT firmware signing keys – HSMs, ID cards, TEEs – OS bootloaders & VM root anchors – Notary services that depend on immutable cryptographic anchors 3/ In these systems, key rotation is expensive, risky, or simply impossible. But compliance, forward security, and future trust will require quantum resilience. This creates a tension: how do you gain post-quantum guarantees without touching legacy keys? 4/ The new proposal makes this possible: As long as the key was derived from a seed (as in canonical EdDSA), a STARK or Ligero zero-knowledge proof of ownership can be generated, with quantum-safe assurances... all while keeping the key and identifier intact. 5/ Yes, a software or firmware update is needed to support the new logic, but you don’t need to regenerate keys, reissue identities, or break compatibility. This decouples quantum-readiness from the painful key migration process. 6/ This matters across industries: – A hardware wallet with EdDSA keys burned in at the factory can prove quantum-safe ownership. – A VPN router in the field since 2018 can assert a PQ upgrade path. – A passport chip can verify quantum resilience, without being reissued. 7/ And the impact goes deeper (cryptographers please read that): This work hints that future cryptographic standards, including @NIST post-quantum schemes should consider adopting hashed-seed key derivation rather than exposing raw private material. This design principle gives us a fallback: If lattices (or any other new primitive) are broken later, hashed seeds would let us evolve without rotating addresses or secrets again. Read @billatnapier's post: 8/ So this isn’t just a blockchain fix. It’s a shift in cryptographic thinking, towards forward-compatible key material that can prove security across eras, algorithms, and threat models. 9/ We believe this could influence how keys are generated and stored across all cryptographic systems in the coming years, including identity layers, infrastructure trust anchors, and post-quantum TLS/VPN stacks. Maybe before full quantum safe transition by 2030-35 most entities should at least switch now to EdDSA just in case. To sum up: “We showed that you can wrap a legacy key in quantum safety, without changing the public key or breaking the system. This may reshape how we generate and future-proof private keys going forward.”